INTRODUCTION
China's Property Law of 2007 ("CPL") is the latest addition to the family of civil property law. The CPL was highly controversial in China before its enactment. A law professor at Peking University Law School (a top law school in China) even wrote a public letter on the internet, contending that the CPL would be unconstitutional because of its capitalistic bent.
1 This high-profile incident delayed the enactment of the CPL for a couple of years. The story of the CPL is not only socialism versus capitalism, but also the competition between the U.S. and Germany (or American common law and Germanmodel civil law 2. There are, of course, other legal systems, such as the French-model civil law, the Nordic legal system, and the Islamic legal system. See, e.g., KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998). Nevertheless, because of network effects, it makes more sense for the CPL to base its system on either the common law (also used by, for instance, Hong Kong and Singapore) or the German-model civil law (also used by Japan and Taiwan, to name a few), as adopting either regime makes it easier for Chinese businessmen to communicate with China's major trading partners and attract more foreign direct investment.
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PROPERTY LAW WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 347 Academic Exchange Service ("DAAD") Foundation in Germany, 3 among others, have poured grants into China since the 1980s, 4 partly hoping to convert the Chinese legal system to their own camp. Eventually, the CPL and the preceding Contract Law of 1999 followed the model of civil law, probably due to the difficulty of transplanting the bottom-up common-law system, and due to the more centralized structure in civil-law systems.
5 Below I will demonstrate that centralization of land use power is the most prominent "Chinese characteristic" in the CPL.
Chinese scholars have emphasized the "Chinese characteristics" of the CPL. Indeed, since former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping used this term in the 1980s, the political structures, economic institutions, and legal system characteristics in China that are different from those in other countries have been described as having Chinese characteristics. One example is "socialism with Chinese characteristics," which was written into the preamble of the PRC Constitution in 1993. This essay takes this claim of Chinese characteristics seriously and tries to flush out the unique features of the CPL. Some leading property scholars in China have identified the major Chinese characteristics of the CPL as adopting state and collective ownership of land and inventing three new types of superficies rights. 6 Others even argue 3. According to DAAD official website, DAAD "is the largest funding organisation in the world supporting the international exchange of students and scholars." See http://www.daad .de/portrait/wer-wir-sind/kurzportrait/08940.en.html. DAAD has funded, among others, the translation of many German legal textbooks and treaties into Chinese.
4. According to its official website, the Ford Foundation has "made grants totaling more than $275 million dollars in China." See http://www.fordfoundation.org/regions/china/history. The Ford Foundation has funded, among others, the translation of many books by American legal scholars into Chinese.
5. At the outset of the twentieth century, when China, then ruled by the Qing Dynasty, was considering whether to emulate the civil law or the common law, the former was preferred because of its more centralized power structure. [Vol. 1:345 that the most salient Chinese characteristic is "equal protection" 7 of public property and private property. 8 Nevertheless, the "equal protection" achievement of the CPL might be more aptly viewed as an improvement in property jurisprudence within China than viewed as a theoretical breakthrough or a Chinese characteristic. Protection of private property has been emphasized in property scholarship outside China, but it does not follow that state ownership (or collective ownership, if recognized as a form of ownership) is not "equally" protected. 9 As for the special forms of ownership and superficies, they are indeed Chinese inventions, but they are not the only Chinese characteristics of the CPL. Many other interesting and special features of the CPL have not yet been identified by commentators.
In order to spell out other Chinese characteristics of the CPL, the comparative law approach is necessary. Surely, comparative law scholarship regarding the CPL is not in short supply, but the literature has only emphasized the CPL's inheritance of the German Civil Code (Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches) ("BGB") and Swiss Civil 7. "Equal protection" became an issue because the PRC Constitution of 1982 stipulates that public property is sacred and inviolable (Article 12) while private property is only inviolable, but not sacred (Article 13), leading to the interpretation that public property enjoys more constitutional protection than private property. The equal protection argument is that the CPL has given private property and public property "equal protection."
8. 
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Code-and even the influence of the former USSR. 10 The critical role of Taiwan's Civil Code ("TCC") 11 has been mostly neglected. 12 This essay contends that only by comparing the CPL with the TCC can one really appreciate the Chinese characteristics of the CPL.
13 This essay will highlight several theoretically interesting differences between the CPL on the one hand and TCC, BGB, and other civil codes on the other hand.
The important role of the TCC in understanding the CPL deserves further explanation. First of all, enacted around 1930, the TCC was the law of the land in China for twenty years, until the Chinese Communist Party abolished every law stipulated by the Republican government, 14 which continued to rule Taiwan after 1949 and implemented the TCC there. In addition, the TCC was also modeled after BGB and the Swiss Civil Code. With the same legal origins, a comparison of the differences between the TCC and the CPL is more likely to reveal the real Chinese characteristics than comparing the CPL with the private laws in Hong Kong, Singapore, or Macau.
15 Similar cultural traditions between China and Taiwan further enable us to rule out Confucianism or other aspects of Chinese culture as the reasons for the differences. Moreover, the CPL may have imported German and Swiss property law by emulating the TCC. The TCC, intended to govern the whole of China, remained 10 14. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some Chinese judges in the post-1949 era still consult the TCC and use the doctrines contained in the TCC as fundamental private-law principles in adjudications.
15. Hong Kong and Singapore have received the English common law, while Macau transplanted its Civil Code from Portugal, whose system had been influenced by the Code Napoléon.
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PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 1:345 intact when the CPL was drafted and enacted, 16 making the TCC a fitting starting point for the CPL lawmakers. Indeed, the structures of the German and Swiss Law of Things in their respective civil codes differ greatly from the structure of the CPL, 17 whereas the structure of the CPL is more congruent to that of the TCC. 18 Finally, long before the enactment of the CPL, leading Chinese property scholars heavily cited their Taiwanese colleagues' doctrinal interpretations of the TCC, as well as decisions, "precedents," and interpretations rendered by the ordinary courts and constitutional court in Taiwan. Since the passing of the CPL, scholars continue this practice.
This essay classifies the unique features of the CPL into two types: (1) stipulations that are available elsewhere but are omitted in the CPL; and (2) stipulations that cannot be found elsewhere. The two types are discussed in Parts I and II, respectively.
Dissatisfied with merely describing these unique features, this essay employs the law-and-economics approach to analyze them. Because extant literature in English focuses more on the evolution of Chinese property law 19 or security rights such as mortgage, 20 this essay, to the best of my knowledge, is the first to apply economic analysis to the CPL. Specifically, this essay examines the costs and benefits with and without such unique features, and explores the possible economic reasons behind them. 21 Because China is contemplating 16 . Only one article in the Book of Law of Things in the TCC was revised before the CPL was passed.
17. But see Chen, supra note 12, at 991 (arguing that the structural layout of the CPL resembles that of the BGB and the Japanese Civil Code).
18. The CPL and the TCC both start with general principles, registration for real estate, delivery of personal property, etc.; then both stipulate ownership, condominium law, neighborly relations, and co-ownership; what follows is several types of superficies and then servitude; then comes (ordinary) mortgage, maximum amount mortgage, pledge of personal property, pledge of rights, and right of retention; and finally possession.
19 21. Granted, economic analysis of law, if anything, is a capitalistic methodology, and yet many unique features of the CPL are arguably driven by socialistic ideology and the communist party's political concerns. Here I do not intend (or pretend) to excavate the actual rationales behind the decisions by the CPL lawmakers, but instead explore whether there may be economic reasons that are also supporting the unique features of the CPL. My analysis reveals that the most salient Chinese characteristic of the CPL is the centralization of (thing use) power, as the CPL subjected the three types of superficies rights to public regulations (rather than to private negotiations), and chose not to recognize the right of first possession. Adding administrative regulations into the CPL also increases controls by Beijing.
Some Chinese characteristics of the CPL make economic sense. For example, because land in China is not privately owned and cannot be transferred, optional registration of farming rights will not impose high information costs on third parties. Also, not recognizing the right to abandon minimizes the social costs of abandonment, given that the right of first possession is not included in the CPL. Giving up the venerated accession doctrine (specificatio) and adverse possession doctrine in the CPL is more efficient than incorporating it. Nevertheless, the omission of the accessio and confusio doctrines in the CPL is welfare-reducing.
The CPL also demonstrates China's late-mover advantage. The definition of property rights in the CPL is more logically consistent than that in other civil codes. Paring down the contents in the "neighborly relations" part of the CPL and leaving it for regulatory statutes avoids the interpretive problems between the civil code and regulations that other civil law countries have experienced.
I. NOTABLE OMISSIONS
The omissions discussed below are no doubt conscious decisions made by the CPL lawmakers. The right of first possession, the right to abandon, the accession principle, and the adverse possession doctrines are stipulated in most, if not all, civil law jurisdictions, including Germany and Taiwan, and many Chinese legal scholars have elaborated on them in their works before the enactment of the CPL.
In addition, most of these rights or doctrines have been included in one or more drafts of the CPL but left out in the final version. In this Part, I will discuss the possible reasons for the omissions and evaluate their economic consequences.
A. Right of First Possession
While the right of first possession has been long lauded as the root of titles in U.S. law, 23 and at least still has a place in most civil codes, the CPL lawmakers avoided giving such a right, supposedly because the rule of first possession is impractical (as there will be very few such cases), 24 it encourages "gains without pains," and it may contribute to the loss of state properties. 25 Nevertheless, even if the rule of first possession is impractical, it will not lead to loss of state properties, and in any case the CPL could easily put state properties off-limits. In addition, possession still requires effort; thus, first possession should not be considered a windfall. Furthermore, the rule of first possession may only be used in practice occasionally, but containing a provision on first possession in the CPL takes only a small amount of fixed costs in legislating, and this would avoid a lot of confusion in practice and save the judges from the laborious work of reinventing this rule. 26 As for encouraging windfall gains, most jurisdictions in the world recognize the rule of first possession, and this rule does not seem to create such a bad incentive scheme.
There should be deeper reasons for ousting the rule of first possession from the CPL. The first reason which comes to mind is socialistic ideology. The doctrine of first possession transforms resources from being held in common to being owned privately, averting much 26. Weixing Shen, a leading property scholar at Tsinghua University Law School, China, told me that he believed if courts in China handle a case that is best dealt with by the doctrine of first possession, they will still do it, notwithstanding the rejection of the doctrine by the legislature.
of the tragedy of the commons along the way.
27 Socialism (particularly Chairman Mao's communism), however, praises resources held in common, and believes that as long as everyone acquires only what she needs from the commons, there will be no tragedy of the commons. Thus, for socialists, the rule of first possession provides no benefits.
The second reason is maintaining centralized power. As Richard Epstein pointed out more than 30 years ago, either first possession or common ownership has to be the root of title, but the latter requires much more extensive public control than the former. 28 In other words, the rule of first possession decentralizes the process of resource allocation. 29 Hence, not recognizing the right of first possession in the CPL retains centralized controls on allocation of unassigned resources.
Indeed, the CPL does just that. The things that are usually subject to first possession, 30 such as city land, mineral resources, water, wild animals and plants, and the broadcast spectrum, have all been declared state-owned by the CPL (Articles 46-50). In addition, rural land and other natural resources are collectively owned (Article 58). Finally, the CPL does not recognize the right to abandon, so there is no abandoned chattel for first possession. Consequently, even if the CPL stipulates a right of first possession, there is hardly anything to get first possession of. 31 Still, not recognizing such a right leaves the state to allocate resources that have not been designated as publicly or collectively owned in statutes.
B. Right to Abandon
While in the U.S. the abandonment of fee simple interests and other possessory interests in real property is flatly prohibited, 32 the civil law systems the rights to abandon both personal and real properties are usually recognized by the civil codes. 33 The CPL, however, for unknown reasons, is silent about the general right to abandon. 34 Theoretically, it does not matter, as, following Tom Merrill's argument, one can deduce the right to abandon from the right to exclude, 35 which is defined as the core element of property rights in Article 2 of the CPL. Nevertheless, traditional civil property law scholarship never links the right to exclude with the right to abandon. It will be almost a leap of faith for the Chinese courts to make such a deduction.
Doctrinal interpretations aside, the more pressing issue for China should be whether it will be welfare-enhancing to formally recognize the right to abandon in the future Chinese civil code. Lior Strahilevitz provides the most comprehensive and insightful costbenefit analysis of the right to abandon. 36 He pointed out three costs of abandonment: third parties' confusion as to the state of ownership of property (that is, whether the assets are lost, mislaid, or abandoned); deterioration of an asset's value during the time period of abandonment; and lawless-race costs to be the first one to capture the abandoned assets. 37 To apply Strahilevitz's insights to the Chinese context, first consider 38 Nevertheless, the right to abandon negative market value chattels in any case will be qualified by public regulations or criminal laws. And most law-and-economists would agree that it is welfare-reducing to allow people to abandon negative market value chattels and impose external costs. Thus, whether in the CPL or other statutes, abandonment of negative market value chattels should be discouraged.
Second, Table 1 assumes that people will abandon or first possess movable things only if they have a de jure right to do so. It is unclear how often people exercise the de facto rights in the absence of de jure rights. 39 Part of the answers to these empirical questions lie in the enforcement level of other regulatory statutes and criminal laws that, for instance, punish people for dumping toxic wastes at will or misappropriating state-owned assets.
That being said, from Table 1 one can get a sense of why the CPL does not recognize a right to abandon chattels. While Strahilevitz focused on Cells (1) and (3) in Table 1 , given that the CPL does not recognize the right of first possession, our discussions on China 38. For the distinction between positive and negative market value chattels in the right to abandon context, see Strahilevitz, supra note 33, at 362-72.
39. For example, people littering or throwing toxic waste on public land without being caught have a de facto right to abandon.
should focus on Cells (2) and (4). The comparison of these two cells (indeed, all four cells) immediately reveals that, as long as the exercise of de facto rights can be reasonably curbed, not recognizing the right to abandon minimizes the social costs of abandonment.
The social costs of abandoning real properties should be lower than those of abandoning chattels. Given my analysis above and the fact that land is publicly owned in China, it is not surprising that if China recognizes the right to abandon constructions or apartments in the future, it will adopt the escheat system, 40 in which abandoned real properties automatically become state-owned. In this case, race costs and confusion costs are essentially zero. As long as a notification to the registrar is the prerequisite to abandoning real properties, deterioration costs should be low-as compared to the high deterioration costs for abandoned chattels (see Cell (2) in Table 1 ).
Of course, to complete the cost-benefit analysis, we have to pay attention to the benefits of abandonment as well. As Strahilevitz pointed out, the major benefits of abandonment are "reduced transaction and decision costs." 41 Theoretically, however, it is difficult to determine whether Cell (3) or Cell (4) will produce higher net benefits. Consequently, it might make economic sense for the CPL to aim for the (relatively) sure thing-minimizing social costs of abandonment by not recognizing the general right to abandon.
C. The Accession Principle
Although specificatio, accessio, and confusio are stipulated in four drafts of the CPL, ultimately the CPL does not say a word about them, purportedly because they rarely happen in the real world and in any case are better dealt with in tort law.
42 Below I will argue that it is efficient to leave the specificatio doctrine out of the CPL, but efficient to incorporate accessio and confusio doctrines into the CPL.
First of all, a primer on the three doctrines for readers immersed in common law: What the venerable doctrines of specificatio, accessio, and confusio do is reallocate titles to property. Specificatio arises when a man's labor is mixed with another's thing, whereas accessio and confusio arise when two things owned by different parties are combined or intermingled, respectively. Tom Merrill has used the term "the accession principle" to cover specificatio, accessio, confusio, and some other related doctrines, but in the U.S., the term "accession" is more often used to cover only specificatio and accessio, distinguished from "confusion" (confusio). 43 This American typology will certainly confuse civil lawyers, who instead group accessio together with confusio. 44 From an economic standpoint, the civil-law classification makes more sense, because specificatio and the other two doctrines are different in terms of their economic efficiency (more on this below).
Specificatio
The U.S. common law 45 and the second draft of the CPL have adopted similar specificatio doctrines. 46 The basic structure of this doctrine is as follows: a bad-faith improver can neither gain title nor request compensation; a good-faith improver will gain title if the "disparity-of-value test" is met, but will have to compensate the owner the value of the object before the improvements were undertaken. 47 According to the "normative Hobbes theorem," "the law should allocate property rights to the party who values them the most. In any case, in my opinion, the CPL lawmakers make a wise choice in not reallocating titles to properties when nonconsensual improvements happen.
Accessio and Confusio
The accessio and confusio doctrines in the second draft of the CPL 50 transplant those in the BGB (Sections 946-948) and resemble those in the TCC (Sections 811-813). If a movable thing is combined with an immovable thing (building or land) in such a way that the former becomes an essential part of the latter, the ownership of the immovable thing extends to the movable thing. And if two movable things are combined or intermingled in such a way that they both become an essential part of a unified thing, the previous owners become co-owners of this thing, except when one of the things can be regarded as the "principal thing," 51 in which case its owner acquires the sole ownership but has to compensate the other owner. Below I will first argue that the CPL should have contained provisions on accessio and confusio, and then demonstrate how these two doctrines can be interpreted economically.
Although in practice very few people would litigate over accessio or confusio (particularly that of personal properties), these two doctrines should be an indispensable part of any civil code. 52 Disputes regarding accessio or confusio arise when, for instance, paints are attached to tables, liquid fertilizers are sprayed onto the land, or two cans of tomato juice are poured into one big jug. Without the force of these two doctrines, two ownerships exist in the colorful table, fertilized plot, and full jug. Yet any previous owner (say, that of the paints) who tries to control or possess her "thing" will at the same 50 . See SHEN, supra note 24, at 227. 51. The opposite of a principal thing is an accessory thing. Pursuant to Article 68 of the TCC, an accessory thing is not part of a principal thing, but the former usually facilitates the utilization of the latter. The disposition of a principal thing extends to its accessories. In the TCC, a principal thing and an accessory thing have to belong to the same owner, while the BGB does not have such a requirement. time possess the thing (say, the table) of the other party. Neither has the right to claim sole title to the combined or intermingled thing. Absent the doctrines of accessio and confusio in the CPL, if the Chinese court takes the legislative history of the CPL seriously and refuses to infer new doctrines similar to accessio and confusio from other articles in the CPL, the only plausible way to solve the dispute seems to be dividing the combined or intermingled thing apart, which often leads to destruction of both things, if such division or separation is possible at all. Hence, it should be clear that when accessio or confusio happens, there are good economic reasons to reduce the number of titles from two to one, and this is exactly what the doctrines of accessio and confusio serve to do.
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If the doctrines of accessio and confusio are added to China's civil code, they should not be structured, or at least interpreted, in the traditional way. The TCC, BGB, and the second draft of the CPL all contain an obscure criterion to judge whether accessio and confusio have happened-that is, the "essential part" test, which requires the court to determine whether the two originally separate things have become essential parts of the newly combined thing. The "essential part" test is too abstract to make economic sense. The "high separation costs" test that is used occasionally in the TCC and the BGB is a more operable standard for judging accessio and confusio. 54 Specifically, "high separation costs" should be interpreted as follows: if [separation costs]>{[the market value of thing A after separation] plus [the market value of thing B after separation] minus [the market value of the combined or intermingled thing]}, separation costs are high. 55 In other words, if the marginal costs of separation are higher than its marginal benefits, from a social standpoint separation is not worth doing; the law should either assign the title of the combined or intermingled thing to one of the parties or make both parties co-owners, instead of ordering separation. 53 . Specificatio does not suffer from similar problems; thus, a civil code can do without the specificatio doctrine. The reason is that the improver's labor is not a well-defined property. Absent the specificatio doctrine, the improver can neither claim lost title for her labor nor claim title to the improved thing. Thus, the law can simply ignore the contribution of the improver, and allow the thing owner to keep a sole title.
54. To be more exact, in confusio, the criterion is "high identification costs. 
D. Adverse Possession
Adverse possession (or prescriptive acquisition) is a complicated and controversial doctrine. To apply the doctrine, the court has to know the mental state of the possessor, 56 the type of the possessed things (personal properties or real estate), the nature of the possession (open, notorious, continuous, etc.), and the various issues regarding statute of limitations. 57 While most scholars agree on treating bad faith adverse possessors worse than good faith ones (although there is still no consensus on the treatment and its justifications), 58 Lee Anne Fennell has made a strong case for limiting the use of adverse possession doctrine to only bad faith adverse possessions that meet certain requirements, mainly because only a bad faith possessor could be conscious of her making better use of the resource she is possessing. 59 Partly due to its doctrinal complexity, 60 and partly due to its controversial nature, 61 the CPL does not incorporate the adverse possession doctrine.
Law-and-economics scholars have provided several justifications for the American adverse possession doctrine, including slothfulness of the true owner, rewarding diligent possessors, as well as clearing land records and stale claims. 62 Not all of these economic rationales are applicable to China's context, however. Countries (such as China) 56 . Unlike in the U.S., where common law courts do not always inquire whether the adverse possessors are good faith or bad faith, in civil law countries like Germany, France, and Taiwan, the courts have to ascertain whether the adverse possessors are good faith, in order to determine whether to apply the prescription doctrine, or which sets of prescription doctrines to apply. 60. See SHEN, supra note 24, at 223-24 (noting that the scholarly debate on whether to follow the Japanese or the German system of statutes of limitations has yet to be settled, and that this is one of the reasons for the CPL not recognizing adverse possession doctrine).
61. The CPL lawmakers worried that adverse possession is against "socialistic morality" and may encourage "gains without pains." See LIANG & CHEN, supra note 25, at 148; SUN, supra note 1, at 310.
62. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 27, at 37-38. See also Epstein, supra note 52, at 678; Merrill, supra note 58, at 1128-31.
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that adopt the registration system (rather than the recording system employed in almost all American jurisdictions) have much less of a need to clear land records, as old records do not matter anywaythe registration system is designed to avoid the hassles of examining previous land records. Moreover, without any legally recognized future interests in the CPL, 63 there will not be many old claims to be cleared. 64 As for other justifications for adverse possession, I agree with Fennell that the goal of property law should be facilitating transfer of property rights to higher-value users, 65 and the adverse possession doctrine in the U.S. common law is not helpful in this end. 66 Fennell has advocated that the adverse possession doctrine should be narrowed and applied only when two conditions are met: (1) the difference between parties' valuations of the property is very large; (2) a market transaction is not available. 67 Still, I doubt whether even this shrunken version should have a place in the future Chinese civil code. 69. I believe that Fennell's insights are also applicable to movable properties as well, but I will concentrate on frying the bigger fish-real properties-here.
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PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 1:345 superficies rights or servitudes on land 70 is weak, because Fennell's second condition does not hold. A market transaction is not available when one does not know who the true owner is or where she is-in China, the government or the collective, who owns the land, is always there. Granted, adverse possession of buildings could meet the two conditions above. Nevertheless, building ownership is subject to mandatory registration; thus, it is not often difficult to locate the owner.
Not recognizing the right to adversely possess real properties at all in the CPL, therefore, seems to be welfare-increasing. The above discussions show that even a narrow adverse possession doctrine that aims to transfer property rights to higher-value users can at most be infrequently used, mainly due to China's public ownership of land and real property registration system. Discarding the doctrine altogether has the advantage of simplifying the legal rule, thus reducing (social) judicial costs, as no one will litigate in court to claim adverse possession, and the court thus does not have to examine the complicated issues and evidence involved. Eliminating any hope of acquiring titles to real properties through adverse possession should facilitate voluntary transactions, which generally promote efficiency. Moreover, like in the case of the accession doctrine, the property law system can work smoothly without the adverse possession doctrine, because in their absence property law can simply stick to its normthe property rule protection of titles.
II. UNUSUAL CONTENTS
This Part demonstrates and analyzes several groups of unusual contents in the CPL. Subpart A shows that the CPL contains a lot of stipulations of regulatory nature that are not included in other developed countries' civil codes; these unique stipulations are sometimes symbolic and sometimes substantive. Subpart B observes that in at least three ways the CPL uses the governance strategy differently from other civil codes. Subpart C argues that the CPL makes quite 
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a few exceptions to the rule of mandatory registration. Subpart D points out that the CPL defines property rights, which is a rare feat among civil codes.
A. Mixture of Administrative Law and Property Law
One of the most salient differences between the CPL and the TCC-indeed, probably any developed country's civil code, is the mixture of administrative law and property law. 72 A handsome portion of the relatively short CPL is devoted to declaring prohibitions or mandates-but usually without specifying the penalties for violations. Some of the public law-like stipulations direct government agencies and employees to do or not to do certain things. For instance, Article 22 stipulates that the registrar should charge by the number of filings, rather than by the size or market value of the registered real estate. 73 Article 13 forbids the registrar to require, among other things, repetitive registration in the name of annual inspection. Article 57 essentially asks government employees in charge of state-owned properties to work harder. Besides, Articles 10 and 43 declare the legislature's policy stance on a national real estate registration system and rezoning, respectively.
Some of the public law-like stipulations target property interest holders. For example, Articles 83, 89, 90, and 120 tell them to obey the relevant law, whereas Article 11 lists the documents necessary for real estate registration application.
Other stipulations shall find an audience in the general public. For example, Article 42 stipulates that no institution or individual shall withhold, misappropriate, or embezzle the takings compensation. In addition, after Article 4 announces that state-owned, collective, and private properties are protected by law and shall not be infringed upon by any institute or person, Articles 56, 63, and 66 restate that these three types of property are legally protected and are prohibited from occupation, theft, cheating, or being withheld or damaged by any institution or person.
These unusual contents may appear in the CPL because Chinese lawmakers have been accustomed to the command-and-control approach in legislating. The CPL lawmakers thus did not notice that such regulatory contents do not square with other private law contents. Nevertheless, the Contract Law of 1999 and the Tort Law of 2009 do not intermingle administrative contents and private law contents; therefore this argument thus does not hold much water.
An alternative explanation is that the CPL lawmakers may have wished to use the CPL as an educational document for government officials and even the general public. Most Chinese people have grown up immersed in communism, in which every righteous citizen has a right to take resources from the common and has little respect for private properties. Hence, the CPL has to tell its readers: "You, you, and you, we mean it. These are private (or state-owned or collective) properties, not common resources. Get your hands off them." In addition, iteration of "the obvious" in the CPL may also signal the Party/state's will to protect property rights.
B. Different Uses of Governance Strategy
Henry Smith has famously distinguished the strategies for delineating property rights into exclusion and governance. In the exclusion strategy, "decisions about resource use are delegated to an owner," whereas the governance strategy "pick[s] out uses and users in more detail." 74 For transaction cost reasons, property law has to rely on the exclusion strategy most of the time and as a default, while using the more costly governance strategy to delineate property rights when the stakes are high. 75 Interestingly, the CPL uses the governance strategy in a different fashion than the TCC and other civil codes do. I discuss three examples below. 
Superficies Subject to Public Regulation
The CPL frequently uses public regulation in delineating the three types of superficies rights 76 : the farming right (Articles 124-134) , 77 the construction right (Articles 135-151) , 78 and the residence right (Articles 152-155) . 79 Ordinarily, the term, renewal, transfer, and other contents of a superficies right is subject to negotiation between the "bare owner" 80 and the (potential) holders of lesser property interests. Under the CPL, due to the state ownership of land in the city (Article 47) and collective ownership of farmland (Article 60), 81 the bare owners in a superficies relation are always the state or "the collective,"
82 whereas the holders of farming, construction, or residence rights are private parties. Still, the CPL can authorize the "quasi-public" 83 collectives and the local governments that manage the state properties to negotiate, as if they were private parties, the contents of the superficies with the (potential) holders of lesser property interests. The CPL, however, chooses instead to rely on the governance strategy more heavily than the TCC and other civil codes do.
The CPL deprives the collectives and local governments (as managers of state properties) of discretion, and controls various contents of superficies rights. For example, Article 126 stipulates that upon expiration of farming rights, the bare owners generally are obliged 76 . For an overview of these three types of superficies rights, see Rehm & Julius, supra note 13, at 208-16. 77. This right can be literally translated as the "right to manage land through contracting" (tudi chengbao jingyingquan). Article 125 of the CPL stipulates that a holder of such a right enjoys the right to possess, utilize and obtain profits from the farmland, forestland and grassland.
78. This right can be literally translated as the "right to use construction land" (jiansheyongdi shiyongquan). Article 135 of the CPL prescribes that a holder of such a right shall, according to law, be entitled to possess, utilize and obtain profits from the state-owned land, and have the right to build buildings and their accessory facilities.
79. This right can be literally translated as the "right to use residential housing land" (zhaijidi shiyongquan). Article 152 stipulates that a holder of such a right shall enjoy the right to possess and utilize collectively owned land, and the right to build residential buildings and their accessory facilities on such land. 80. A bare owner or a nude owner is an owner of a thing that is burdened by a lesser property interest, such as mortgage or servitude.
81. Many other different types of resources are state-owned or collectively owned. See Articles 45-52, 58, and 59 of the CPL.
82. Article 60 defines how and when the resource is collectively owned. For discussions of the meaning of "the collective" in the CPL, see Chen, supra note 10, at 19-22.
83. The nature of the collectives is a complicated question and I will defer the discussion to another paper.
to renew. 84 Similarly, Article 149 stipulates that construction rights on residential land are automatically renewed upon expiration. 85 In addition, Article 126 prescribes the exact term of farming rights on arable land (30 years). Moreover, according to Article 153, the acquisition, exercise, and transferal of residence rights are regulated by the Land Management Act, among other statutes. Finally, Articles 128 and 140 require holders of farming rights and construction rights to obtain approvals from relevant competent administrative agencies if they plan to use the land in a different way.
The rationales behind these unconventional uses of the governance strategy are probably to centralize land use power.
86 If the length of term and the standards for renewal and allowing changes of land use are not specified by a national law, but are left to the discretions of the collectives or local governments, the central government would lose the power to shape land use policy. Additionally, as Steven Cheung pointed out in China's context, "[t]he right to decide and allocate land use is the key issue in a developing country," and the economic power has already by and large rested in the xians (a level of local government below provinces and cities) in today's China. 87 Given the non-private land ownership under the CPL, centralization of power, however, is not necessarily a bad thing. 88 The farming right and the residence right are so-called "member rights," meaning that one has to be a member in the collective to qualify for acquisition of such rights in the first place. 89 In addition, the constitutional right to travel freely within the country (or, for that matter, to change "membership") is still in its infancy. Consequently, the collectives are monopolists in agricultural land and land for residential use in the 84 . See CUI, supra note 34, at 278. 85. Interestingly, the automatic renewal of construction rights on residential land and the bare owners' obligation to renew farming rights make these superficies rights, economically speaking, essentially full ownership.
86. Eva Pils also pointed out that "both rhetorical 'over-protection' in the private sphere and under-protection against the government result in a concentration of power in the hands of the State . . countryside and face no competition from other collectives, because peasants hardly have the right to "exit." Granted, for most homeowners in most jurisdictions, exit is always a costly option. Nevertheless, there are always some people looking for new places to live, and the possibility of "entrance" (particularly entrance of people from the upper echelon, who contribute to the local tax receipt) often stimulates juridical competitions. In China's context, due to the nature of membership right, peasants simply cannot move to different villages. Therefore, local governments have fewer incentives to reduce corruption to attract new taxpayers.
If the land use power is decentralized to the collectives, and they abuse the power, peasants can still "voice."
90 Voice, however, is much less powerful without regular, competitive local elections. A unique type of voicing in China, xinfang or shangfang, 91 is not always very effective and certainly very costly. It is doubtful whether peasants' voice alone is enough to curtail the local corruption. Therefore, the heavy use of the governance strategy in superficies rights to centralize the land use power and to reduce abuse of such power by the collectives may be more welfare-enhancing for Chinese peasants. 
Neighborly Relations Lightly Treated
The "neighborly relations" 93 part in a civil code is usually a gathering point for governance strategies, but the CPL contains a relatively short and simple neighborly relations part. Many civil codes contain long and sophisticated stipulations in the neighborly relations part. For example, in civil codes of Portugal, Italy, Taiwan, and Germany, neighborly relations takes up roughly 20%, 12%, 10%, and 5%, respectively, of 92. Note that the governance strategy used here does not simply transfer the decisionmaking power from local officials to officials in central government. If done this way, it may be the officials in central government that are taking bribes. The crystal-clear rule stipulated by the national legislature, instead, gives no official the opportunity to take bribes.
93. In civil law systems, the law of neighborly relations contains doctrines that in the common law would usually be discussed in nuisance law, and sometimes in trespass law.
number of articles. And many of these stipulations are typical examples of the governance strategy. 94 By contrast, only 4% (9 out of 247) of the CPL concerns neighborly relations, and the nine articles are brief.
95
I have two conjectures on the light treatment of the neighborly relations by the CPL. First, land is either collectively owned or stateowned; thus, there is no private dispute between neighboring landowners, simplifying the neighborly relations. Second, many civil codes were enacted before the rise of the regulatory state. Adjustments of property rights in a civil code will not be in conflict with an existing public regulation. In China, the development is the other way around-many regulations were already in place by 2007. Thus, sophisticated governance of neighborly relations in the CPL may confuse the administrative agencies or the court as to when and whether the CPL or regulatory statutes should prevail. Therefore, the CPL shies away from beefing up the contents in the neighborly relations part, but only because the governance strategy has already been employed elsewhere-in regulatory statutes.
Imposition of a Market Standard
The socialistic CPL at times imposes a market standard when capitalistic civil codes fail to. 96 Articles 195, 219, and 236 require that market prices shall be used as benchmarks when mortgaged, 95. Note that the CPL contains 14 other articles regarding condominiums, which are traditionally treated as part of the neighborly relations. For the CPL lawmakers, it makes sense to emphasize condominium dispute resolution, as apartments, unlike land, are mostly privately owned.
96. For example, the civil codes of Taiwan, Germany, and the Netherlands do not impose such market standards. Section 1221 of the BGB does mention market price, but does not use it as a mandatory benchmark. Section 1221 of the BGB stipulates that "if the pledged item has a stock exchange or market price, the pledgee may affect the sale privately at the current price through a commercial broker officially authorized to affect such sales or through a person authorized to sell by public auction." Note, however, that codes of civil procedure or civil enforcement acts may contain stipulations that try to maximize the value of mortgaged, pledged, and retained assets. In Taiwan, anecdotal evidence suggests that mortgaged land and buildings are usually sold or auctioned by the court at below market value (I am starting to work on an empirical project to verify this claim). Imposing a stipulation of a market price standard like those in the CPL and the TCC, if taken seriously, would change the whole dynamics of court auctions and court sales in Taiwan. 369 pledged, and retained assets are "sold" by the court (or other independent institutions) or "converted into money" through bilateral bargaining. Nevertheless, this market price standard is not imposed when these assets are "auctioned" by the court. The CPL does not specify the consequences for failure to comply (for example, when the court sells an asset for 80% of its market value). To my knowledge no Chinese scholars have elaborated on these stipulations, either. If these articles are interpreted to mean that a mortgagor's debt claim equivalent to the asset's market price will be written off, no matter how much the asset is actually sold for, Articles 195, 219, and 236 use a strong governance strategy. If these articles are instead just a gentle reminder or a wish by the lawmakers, the governance strategy adopted here is at most symbolic.
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C. Occasional Optional Registration
Registration of real property rights is not always mandatory, declarations by Articles 9, 14, and 17 of the CPL notwithstanding.
98
For instance, servitudes and residence rights need not be registered (Articles 158 and 155, respectively). 99 China has yet to have a unified registration system or an electronic real estate registration database, 100 and many lesser property interests had not been registered before the enactment of the CPL in 2007, either. The huge 97. At the private law workshop in Renmin University Law School, the attending scholars, judges, and doctoral students all have a different take of what these three articles mean. Notably, a judge in the People's Supreme Court informed me that in practice, "market prices" are a floating concept. Secured assets are usually auctioned first. After two rounds of auction, if no one bids, the court will try to sell the secured assets at half price-because in the second auction, the asset is listed at 80% × 80% = 64% of its original market price, and it is expected that only by further lowering the sale price can the court actually sell the asset. The judge contends that the practice will not violate Articles 195, 219, and 236, because the asset's "market price" has decreased as the foreclosure process drags on.
No matter how these three articles are interpreted, their ambiguity imposes transaction costs on parties who need to use secured transactions.
98. Pursuant to Articles 9 and 14, modifications of real property rights shall take effect upon registration, unless otherwise provided by law. Article 17 adds that the land register is the final authority on real property rights.
99. See LIANG & CHEN, supra note 25, at 275. 100. Although Article 10 of the CPL proclaims that it implements a "unified registration system," the real estate registration system in China as it now stands is extremely complicated, as various administrative agencies are in charge of registration for different property rights. For a list that matches the property rights with the agencies in charge, see SHEN, supra note 24, at 167-70.
administrative costs of integrating all the current real estate registration systems, investigating all unregistered interests to put them on record, and daily updating of registration records must have prevented the CPL from sticking to the system of mandatory registration that is quite common in civil-law jurisdictions such as Germany and Taiwan.
One particularly interesting example of optional registration is farming rights.
101 Local governments are obliged to issue certificates to farming right holders and keep an up-to-date registry, which is separate from the land registry (Article 127). Farming rights that are not registered in the local government's registry are invalid only in relation to third parties acting in good faith (Article 129). For example, Abby is the original holder of a farming right; Abby first sells the right to Bob, without updating the transfer in the local government's registry, and then to Christine who is unaware of the previous transaction between Abby and Bob. Christine will acquire the farming right.
It has been argued that the optional registration of farming rights makes economic sense for the following reasons. First, only peasants who are "members" of the collective are qualified to acquire farming rights, and these peasants would know each other and everyone's rights-information costs are low for potential farming rights acquirers. In addition, the certificates issued by the local governments serve as notice and further decrease third parties' information costs. Finally, mandatory registration of all-literally millions-of farming rights would overwhelm the land registrar.
102
I would add one more economic rationale for the optional registration of farming rights. The key is that a bare owner has incentives to conceal the existence of superficies to her potential buyer (to increase prices), while a holder of superficies rights has incentives to prove to her potential buyer that her right exists (to make a deal). Uniform and mandatory registration, therefore, reduces information costs mostly for land buyers. But since under the CPL, farming land is collectively owned and cannot be sold, no potential buyers exist to 101. For criticism of optional registration of farming rights, see CUI, supra note 34, at 266-67. But see LIANG & CHEN, supra note 25, at 260-61 (arguing that it is impractical to mandate registration).
102. See CHEN, supra note 8, at 222.
